Q3'04
Notes and Observations
Lucent Technologies,
Inc.
9 Months ended June 30, 2004
please see Disclaimer at bottom of report
This report was last amended on November 17, 2004. Amendment was for corrections of 2003 altman z calculations
Lucent Technologies, Inc., designs and delivers networks for the world’s largest communications service providers. The reportable segments are Integrated Network Solutions (“INS”), Mobility Solutions (“Mobility”) and Lucent Worldwide Services (“Services”). The INS segment provides a broad range of software and wireline equipment related to voice networking (primarily consisting of switching products, which Lucent, sometimes refer to as convergence solutions, and voice messaging products), data and network management (primarily consisting of access and related data networking equipment and operating support software) and optical networking. The Mobility segment provides software and wireless equipment to support radio access and core networks. The Services segment is a worldwide services organization that provides deployment, maintenance and professional services in support of Lucent's own product offerings as well as multi-vendor networks.
Notes and observations
1. Lucent has
once again become a technological competitor. During the late 1990’s and early
2000’s, they did lose their technological edge. This loss was caused by
internal fraud, engineer defection, increased competition and technological
disruption. Lucent is known as the leader in supplying Wireless Service
Providers with CDMA
infrastructure. Verizon Wireless is their largest wireless customer. Lucent
strategically decided to abandon
GSM network builds in
2001/2002. This was a controversial decision, since
GSM was the prevalent
system in Europe. CDMA is the alternative to GSM. The mass penetration and
growth of CDMA is
occurring. Over the last year or so, GSM companies, such as ATT Wireless and
Cingular, have given serious consideration in upgrading their networks to
UMTS. UMTS gives GSM
systems, the benefits of 3G
and CDMA operations. UMTS uses
WCDMA technology.
2. Competition and disruption is always a concern for any
developer of communications infrastructure. Lucent has unusual and company
specific, competitive concerns due to their retired labor force and associated
retirement benefits. Lucent has what is called “legacy costs”. These
legacy costs are primarily benefits that need to be paid to retirees.
These costs need to be built into their projects and "Requests
For Proposals" (RFP). Competitors do not have such legacy costs, and
hence can bid on jobs in a less expensive manner, at the same time still retain
greater profitability. Lucent also is contending with several companies
from China. These companies, have lower costs and certainly a qualified “brain
trust”. Up until a year or so ago, China was regarded as telecom copy-cats.
These companies were known to have technology copied from the likes of Lucent,
yet without the technological quality. Many argue that these companies from
China currently now have leading technology, and of course their costs are much
lower. Two of the leading Asian competitors of Lucent are
Huawei and ZTE.
3. In F2003 ATT, BellSouth, SBC, Verizon and Verizon Wireless
contributed 22% of Lucent revenues. Customer concentration does produce greater
risks.
4. There has been a historical general rule of thumb that
Service providers spend 10% - 20% of their revenues on capital expenditures.
These capital expenditures include line maintenance, warehousing, rental or
purchase of real estate, and infrastructure upgrades (switches, routers, routes,
etc). Data and voice networkers, such as Lucent claim that they receive about
50% of that allocation. Of that remaining 50%, being very liberal in rounding
off the allocation, you can say that ½ goes to wireless and ½ goes to wireline
(both voice and data, but that is now being converged into one). When trying to
monitor capex from service providers, I generally use 10% - 15% of revenues. Of
course it is difficult to monitor, but it helps to have an understanding of this
historic trend.
5. Corporate insiders have not been selling many shares for
the last couple of years. Pat Russo , CB owns 2,017,963 shares, Henry Schacht
owns 1,088,014. Frank D’amelio CFO owns 346,518. Assorted other officers own in
the area of 3,000,000 shares. In general, insiders own less than 2% of the
available common stock.
6. The telecom market entered a depression during mid 2000,
which continued through 2003. It appears as though the decline in spending has
ceased. Unlike the mid 1990’s of high double digit spending growth, most
companies are forecasting mid single digit growth. CFO, D’amelio,
recently claimed that Lucent is quite happy with single digit growth,
whereas in the past they would have been extremely disappointed with such
lackluster growth. Lucent once had revenues in excess of $30B. They now do on
average around $2.2B per quarter. Lucent’s breakeven seems to now be in the area
of $2.1B. Nortel (a competitor) issued a revenue warning on September 16,
2004. In that warning they discussed the expected growth of mid single
digits.
7. Service
Providers are expected to spend as little as possible in their
infrastructure over the next few years. One type of spending will be to
save money over the long term. This can be done in network upgrades, be it
wireless or wireline. The other type of spending will be done, to
avoid losing customers to their competition. In the past, Service Providers
would spend for the sake of claiming to have the most efficient network.
8. Certain industry segments are growing faster than others.
Voice and circuit switching is a dying breed, as the telecom is moving to
converge both voice and data over
IP (internet protocol)
systems. The largest growth is expected to be in
VoIP gateways. I have
seen projections of 30 – 50% CAGR in that area. Lucent has been a weak force in
VoIP. They recently purchased a company called
Telica.
Supposedly is strong in the VoIP area. There has yet to be any contract
announcements from the Telica acquisition. There is speculation that
Telica already existed in Verizon’s network. Lucent hinted at analyst day a few
weeks ago, that a contract with a major carrier would be announced at some
point. Lucent claims that the RFP process of a VoIP network is slow, and hence
investors need patience.
9. Lucent does offer an end to end service. They develop the
software, the equipment (generally via
OEMs, outsourcing or via
Joint Ventures), offer the services, and have compatibility with other vendors.
This end to end service is becoming more valuable as the Service Provider
networks are downsized, more complicated and cost controls and profitability of
providers are looked at much closer today, as opposed to the late and mid
1990’s.
Positives:
1. Industry leader in CDMA. This is important as wireless
companies around the world begin to build or upgrade their networks.
2. They have excellent position in China, India and Eastern
Europe.
3. Strong strategic partners such as
Juniper.
4. Balance sheet is getting stronger. Lucent debt was recently
upgraded by Moody’s. Debt is still lower grade, nevertheless the picture is
improving. Debt has been upgraded to B2 (highly speculative) from Caa1
(Substantial risk).
Here is a link on our
site, which has a table on debt ratings.
5. Cost reductions, debt buybacks and stabilizing revenues
have helped make Lucent a stronger company. Unlike mid 2002, they do not appear
to be an immediate or imminent bankruptcy contender.
Here is a link on our site, where we discussed the deterioration of Lucent bonds
during 2002. Lucent short term bonds were selling for nearly $0.30 per
share. The same bonds are now trading over par.
6. Lucent has been consistent with their strategies over the
last 3 years. They recognized and openly discussed their solvency issues. They
laid out a game plan of restructuring and goal of liquidity. So far they have
achieved those goals. More recently they have laid out a framework for continued
profitability. Here
is a link of ours, which details much of Lucent's financial history since 2001.
7. Lucent is one of many companies that were harmed in the
telecom depression. I can’t think of one competitor that has not gone through
the same magnitude of pain. Even Cisco lost nearly 75% of her market cap during
the slowdown. Cisco is not a fair example, as they are not really providers of
end to end networks, nor do they have a great presence with the Service
Providers.
8. Cash flow from operations, not only exists, it also seems
to be improving.
9. Lucent bought back or recapitalized over $2.2B in debt
since the fiscal fourth quarter of 2002. Fixed charges will be reduced by about
$150M due to this.
10. Lucent Worldwide Services (LWS) is a rather new division
of Lucent. Margins are less than Mobility Solutions and INS. Nevertheless,
Lucent claims that LWS gives Lucent the ability to enter a network, which Lucent
does not currently have a presence in , and in turn over time, gives Lucent the
ability to enter that network in other areas. Some of these areas could be
optical switches, bay stations, multiplexers, DSL deployments, etc.
11. Lucent took a charge to their deferred tax asset
during 3Q02. This was done in accordance with
SFAS 109.
There has been recent industry talk that Lucent will be able to bring this asset
on the balance sheet again. The prior write off was in excess of $5B. If
the valuation allowance was materially reduced, Lucent would once again
have a positive tangible book value.
12. Lucent recently announced that they have been approved for a tax refund in
the area of $1B (including interest). Lucent previously recorded a
receivable of $139M. A $1B unanticipated inflow, will be quite positive for
Lucent.
Negatives:
Date
in Millions
|
6/30/2004 |
4,822 |
|
9/30/2003 |
3,950 |
|
9/30/2002 |
3,427 |
|
9/30/2001 |
3,401 |
|
9/30/2000 |
3,232 |
|
9/30/1999 |
3,102 |
|
9/30/1998 |
3,025 |
|
9/30/1997 |
2,895 |
Risks:
1. Concentration of a few customers.
2. Concentration of wireless revenues. Wireless revenues make
up 45% of total revenues and have higher gross profits versus optical
infrastructure, INS and Services. To Lucent’s credit, they do recognize and
bring this to shareholder's attention. Lucent claims that their
projections and guidance include the lower gross profit items.
Lucent also contends that their disappearing pension credits, have also been
considered in their guidance.
3. Wireless portfolio is concentrated in CDMA. Lucent has yet
to recognize revenue in the US with UMTS. Lucent recently announced their first
international UMTS deployment with
ZAPP in Romania.
Lucent has no presence in GSM networks. Lucent has avoided and
exited the GSM networks. Lucent would be hurt incredibly if CDMA was disrupted.
4. I mentioned Cisco as having a limited presence in the
Service Provider market as well as currently lacking an end to end solution for
Service Providers. This could change quickly, if Cisco were to make an
acquisition.
5. Lucent previously lacked a VoIP solution. Verizon gave
Nortel the opportunity to fit them with a VoIP deployment. To Lucent’s benefit,
this is not an exclusive contract and the duration is 18 months. The contract
was entered into during the 4th calendar quarter of 2003. It is hoped that
Lucent's Telica acquisition will not only fill the VoIP void, but also, get
Lucent to have a material presence in Verizon's VoIP network.
6. Of course risks include another period of severe or even
moderate telecom spending slowdown.
7. Please look at
attached Altman Z spreadsheet. Altman Z is a solvency predictor. You can see
my spreadsheet, at my site, which explains the use of the spreadsheet
www.rbcpa.com/altmanzscoretemplate.xls In the attached Altman Z
handout , I made certain assumptions. They are as follows:
a. Retained earnings of $1B. This is an extrapolated and
unsubstantiated number. I have included the $1B tax and interest refund, as well
as including an anticipated deferred tax asset of $4B being put back on the
balance sheet. If both were added to the current deficit, retained earnings
would be greater than $1B. I just preferred using $1B. One could easily argue
that Lucent should not be awarded any positive retained earnings. The only way
Altman Z could be applied with any relevancy would be via positive retained
earnings.
b. Retained earnings is currently a deficit of ($3,064)
An interesting observation is that Altman Z for Lucent is computing to 2.51.
According to the spreadsheet, that number indicates that there is a “high ”
chance of bankruptcy. What is most interesting to me is that when I previously
ran this spreadsheet, the number was producing a result of
1.41 on September 30, 2003, which is a "very high" chance of bankruptcy. Of course, this is only a
slight guide, but at the same time, it shows improvement in the operations
and financial stability of the company.
Potential Scenario:
Please understand that accompanied spreadsheet is merely a “what-if” analysis
for discussion purposes only
1. Revenues to grow at an annual rate for an extended period
of 6 to 10%. Lucent has guided at “mid-single digits” for 2004 only.
Lucent has not offered forward guidance.
2. Gross Margins of 40%. Lucent has guided “from the high 30’s
to the low 40’s in the near term”.
3. Quarterly operating expenses of $700M. I am using the same
as Lucent guidance. Lucent has stated that their mid-term goal is to
achieve net margins of 10 to 15%.
4. Tax rate of 35% starting in F2005, based on the
anticipation of the deferred tax asset of around $4B entering the Balance Sheet.
5. Please understand that our financial model is "raw", subject to material error, and is not based on current company guidance of any sort. We use such models as a "financial road map"
This link will provide the model in excel format www.rbcpa.com/companies/lucentmodel091604.xls
This link will provide the model in html format www.rbcpa.com/companies/lucentmodel091604.html
Disclaimer
If you are a client of ours, and if you
have questions regarding Lucent, please call our office. If you are not a client
of Redfield, Blonsky & Co. LLC Investment Management Division and are
reading this report, we urge you to do your own research. We will not be
responsible for any person making an investment decision based on this report.
This report is a "by-product" of our research. We are not responsible for the
accuracy of this report. We are not responsible for errors that may occur in
this report. Please do not rely on
us to monitor or update this or any other report we may issue. In theory, we
could come across some type of data or idea, which causes us to eliminate Lucent
from our portfolios. This report has undergone revisions starting on September
17,
2004. We will not notify readers of future revisions. We are not responsible to
keep readers of this report updated for changes or material errors or for any
reason whatsoever. This report is dated September 17;
it is possible that by September
20,
2004 we could have
eliminated our entire Lucent position without giving notice to any reader of
this report. We manage portfolios for clients, and those clients are our
greatest concern as it relates to investing. Certain clients of Redfield,
Blonsky & Co LLC may not have Lucent Technologies in their portfolios. There
could be various reasons for this. Again, if you would like to discuss Lucent
Technologies, please contact Ronald R. Redfield, CPA, PFS (partner in charge of
investment management division).
Information
herein is believed to be reliable, but its accuracy and completeness cannot be
guaranteed. Opinions, estimates, and projections constitute our judgment and are
subject to change without notice. This publication is provided to you for
information purposes only and is not intended as an offer or solicitation.
Redfield, Blonsky & Co. LLC and Ronald R Redfield, CPA, PFS, may hold a
position or act as an advisor on any investments mentioned in a report or
discussion.