
This presentation
is not a form of solicitation, nor is it intended to be a recommendation to
purchase or sell any investments. This
presentation is merely intended as a form of sharing of research to the
AAII-SIG. I do personally own AES and
most of my managed portfolios also own AES.
Most of our purchases were made at prices under $9.00 per share. Please see disclaimer on last page of this report. Although there are conclusions at the end of
this report, they need to be taken in context and read with the understanding
of the attached disclaimer. Please understand
that much of this report is hypothetical, and that the conclusions are there
not as a recommendation, but as a sharing of thoughts and information. Again, the ultimate purpose of this report
was to share information with a group of investors that get together and look to share ideas. The intent of this report is merely as a
learning tool. It very well might have
material errors.
PLEASE DO NOT MAKE AES INVESTMENT DECISIONS BASED ON THIS
REPORT. PLEASE DO YOUR OWN
DUE-DILIGENCE
Company Description
Global power company with 35,320 megawatts of total net owned generation
capacity, with another 1,037 under construction.
Breakdown of Operating Capacity (Gross MW) in operation
|
Contract Generation |
15,760 |
|
Competitive Supply |
13,222 |
|
Large Utilities |
5,488 |
|
Growth Distribution |
850 |
|
Total Net Capacity |
35,320 |
Breakdown by Region of Capacity (not all AES owned) (Gross MW) in operation

Operating Capacity (MW) by Fuel Mix
|
Coal |
41% |
|
Natural Gas |
39% |
|
Hydro and Other |
16% |
|
Oil |
4% |
AES has
over 30,000 employees
Annual
Revenues of almost $9.0 Billion.
111 Plants
and 17 distribution Companies
Businesses
in 27 Countries
2003
Sales By Business Segment :

The following is a blurb from the
AES website, “AES was added to the S&P 500 in 1998, and in 2000 the stock
price exceeded $70 per share. The period was characterized by
unprecedented growth, including the acquisition of Electricidad de Caracas in
Venezuela and Gener in Chile, and assuming control of two regional electricity
distribution companies in Kazakhstan.
2001 and 2002 brought numerous
challenges, including the global markets downturn and the collapse of many in
the sector. AES responded by launching a turnaround program, and by 2003, was
on sound financial footing and looking toward the future.
AES today still seeks to be the
world's best power company, now generating and distributing electric power to
11 million people, with generation facilities in 27 countries around the
globe.”
This is how AES describes their
business operations:
“Every electric power plant turns some form of energy into electricity.
Our power plants run on diverse fuels -- from natural gas and coal to biomass
(agricultural and wood waste) and water. We choose the method that makes the
most sense for a particular situation, based on prevailing regulations, fuel
availability and other factors.
In some circumstances we sell
power as a wholesaler, producing energy that other companies deliver; in other
cases we act as the retailer and distribute the power directly to the consumer.
We divide our businesses into four categories – Contract Generation,
Competitive Supply, Large Utilities and Growth Distribution – based on the
scope, customer base, delivery mechanisms or market dynamics involved.”
Sales by Business Segment
|
Coal |
41% |
|
Natural Gas |
39% |
|
Hydro and Other |
16% |
|
Oil |
4% |
Contract
Generation - This segment is essentially
"generation for hire" in which AES creates electricity and sell the
majority of it to a customer who then distributes it. Contract Generation (37% of F2003 Sales) and Competitive
Supply Segments (10% of F2003 Sales) accounted for 47% of F2003 Sales. 80% of these revenues are Long-Term
contracts. 20% of the revenue is
Merchant / Short Term Contracts. Generally
these are sales to Local Utilities or Wholesale customers. Typically the cash flows are stable, the
customer takes the fuel cost and demand risks.
The plants are capital intensive and require debt. AES has been prioritizing the debt as
non-recourse. Non-recourse debt
possibilities increase with the projects credit quality.
AES
owns and operates contract generation plants that sell electricity to utilities
or other customers under long-term contracts (minimum five years and more
typically 15 to 30 years). Fuel supply is usually hedged consistent with the
power sales contract.
New
projects are on line in Asia, Caribbean and USA.
2003
Fleet additions created $500M in new revenues.
72%
of generation capacity are in emerging markets.
Competitive
Supply: are Sales to local
utilities or wholesale customers under short term (spot) contracts. There is higher return potential here,
because AES absorbs the demand and fuel risks.
Sales and cash flow are variable and less predictable than other
segments.
AES highlights that sales growth has been driven by Argentina demand and favorable pricing. Yet, I recently read that there are gas shortages in Argentina, and AES is being forced to buy electricity on the spot market. Supposedly the spot prices are above AES’ marginal costs. Certainly something to monitor. Perhaps this could create an earnings shortfall, which in turn, could perhaps create a buying opportunity, if share prices were to drop.
Most of Competitive supply is coal generated. It is certainly affected by commodity prices.
Large
Utilities - Large Utilities
are their "heavy hitters" in the electric power arena: Indianapolis
Power & Light (IPL) in the U.S., Eletropaulo Metropolitana Electricidad de
Sao Paulo S.A. (Eletropaulo) in Brazil, and La Electricidad de Caracas (EDC) in
Venezuela. In most cases large utilities combine generation, transmission and
distribution - covering the entire supply chain. These giant utilities, of
which AES is majority owners, maintain monopolies with defined service areas
selling electricity under regulated tariff agreements. They each have
transmission and distribution capabilities (IPL and EDC also have generation
plants).
Large Utilities (40% of F2003 Sales)
and Growth Distribution (13% of F2003 Sales) accounted for 53% of F2003
Sales. The business driver for Large
Utilities is monopoly positions, regulated prices; demand is determined by
local economy. AES has 17 Utilities in
8 different countries.
The following are 3 of AES
utilities:
|
Indianapolis Power and Light (IPALCO) |
100% ownership |
|
Eletropaulo in Brazil |
32% ownership |
|
C.A. LaElectricidad de Caracas (EDC) Venezuela |
86% ownership |
a.
IPALCO is holding
company for Indianapolis Power and Light (IPL).
b.
They generate and
sell electricity to 450,000 customers. 3,300 of capacity, of which 99% is coal
fired. IPL has $690M in cumulative net operating income deficiencies, hence
must inform utility commission if dividends are planned.
c.
EDC has 1M customers.
2600 MW of capacity.
d.
Eletropaulo has 5m customers. 30-year concession contract with National Electric Energy Agency
(ANEEL). Tariffs are increased to
reflect ROE. Negotiated every 4 years.
Next pricing negotiations are 2007.
Growth Distribution - distributes power in developing countries or regions
where the demand for electricity is expected to grow faster than in more
developed parts of the world. They are smaller businesses than the integrated
utilities businesses, serve a smaller service area, and generally need
substantial infrastructure improvements. However, they also have the
opportunity to benefit from operating improvements that may stimulate above
average growth in earnings and cash flow performance. Electricity sales are
made under regulated tariff agreements or under existing regulatory laws and
provisions. Distribution facilities in this line of business may include
integrated generation, transmission, distribution or related services
companies.
The following are
some tables I constructed which highlights some financial data.
2004 Projected ebitda breakdown :
|
Contract Generation |
47.2% |
|
Large Utilities |
33.7% |
|
Growth Distribution |
9.9% |
|
Competitive Supply |
7.7% |
|
Corporate and others |
1.5% |
2003 Sales By Business Segment :

2003 Operating Capacity (MW) Fuel Mix :
|
Coal |
41% |
|
Natural
Gas |
39% |
|
Hydro
and Other |
16% |
|
Oil |
4% |
Notes and Observations:
1.
AES has non-fired gas
capacity, they will benefit most from increased electricity demand. As prices increase, their costs are not as
associated with fuel price increases.
2.
AES had an action
plan going into 2004. This plan was
aimed at debt reduction, strengthening the balance sheet, improve their credit
quality and begin the process of improving margins.
3.
During F2004 recourse
debt was reduced by $800M. Both S&P
and Moody’s raised their credit quality.
S&P rates debt at B+ and Moody’s rates debt as B1 (highly
speculative). Both agencies have AES on
positive outlook. Management goal is BB
level (low grade speculative).
4.
86% of cash flows
from regulated utilities and contract generation.
5.
18.1B in total
debt. $13B of that is
non-recourse.
6.
Potential debt to
equity level of 76% by 2007. Current
debt to equity of 86%.
7.
Interest Coverage
ratio is 1.9X (I like to see that at 4 or greater, maybe one day for AES).
8.
Morningstar calls
Duke Energy, Calpine and Reliant Energy as its peers.
9.
Sales growth dropped
in 2002 and 2003 because of asset sales to restore finances. 2004 growth is coming from tariff increases,
higher wholesale prices and increased energy demand.
10.
Interest expense
consumed 25% of revenue in 2003. This
should drop with debt pay-downs in 2004.
11.
In 2001 AES reached
50,700MW. In 2002 the US merchant
industry melted down and devaluation of Argentina peso caused a severe crisis
for AES. Two years of divestitures left
AES with 34,500 MW.
What I see as potential positives:
1.
Possible refinancing
in emerging debt market. AES was shut
out of debt markets for a number of years.
Refinancing would be done at more favorable terms.
2.
Debt upgrades
important. One reason I see is the capital intensity of the business requires
financing. Nature of the business. Hence, demands and costs are much less with
higher debt grades. AES if upgraded can
further refinance existing debt on more favorable terms.
3.
Management appears
focused and competent in their mission.
They realize that AES is a “show me” company. They are focused on debt reduction, credit quality enhancement,
margin expansion, strategic acquisitions and increased Return on Capital (ROC).
4.
Worldwide demand in
power, there is a growing demand for electricity.
5.
World bank has
supposedly been favoring AES in lending and in influencing potential customers
to partner with AES. AES appears to be
a proven and respected force.
6.
Competition has been
reduced as several companies have exited the industry.
7.
Bonds are showing
pricing strength. This signifies that
Wall Street believes in AES.
8.
Grants Interest Rate
Observer on March 15, 2002, mentions that there is potentially $10 - $12B in
assets on the books. I spoke with a
researcher yesterday and he remembered $13B.
9.
3 subsidiaries have
publicly exchange-traded shares. I have not verified this, nor have I looked at
them. EDC in Venezuela, Eletropaulo in
Brazil and Gener in Chile. These 3
subsidiaries are valued at approx $1.5B or $2.40 per share. S&P expects these 3 subs to pay
dividends of $160M to AES in 2004. All
subs are expected to pay in area of $800M.
Eletropaulo is expected to pay down debt and not dividends.
10.
Subsidiary
distributions are in the annual $1B range.
This is expected to stay the same or improve over the next 5 years.
11.
AES is a holding
company. Because there are such a great
amount of subsidiaries, it is important to look at operating cash flow. It is very important to recognize the
dividend contribution from the subsidiaries.
This is currently in the $1billion annual range.
12.
AES announced on
January 11, 2005, an agreement to acquire SeaWest Holdings. SeaWest is a wind power operator and developer. This is the first major growth project fro
AES, since problems of 2001. I recently
read an analyst report, whereas a material financial event is not expected over
the near term. Cost is $60M in cash.
Currently SeaWest is producing revenues of $20M. This will give AES production of 500 MW of
capacity. Supposedly one of the largest
US providers of wind power.
13.
Morningstar indicated
that more than 80% of energy in its competitive supply business is generated
through low cost coal and hydro, giving cost advantage over gas fired
competitors.
14.
AES looks to curb currency fluctuations by employing more
debt in local currencies, rather than in USD.
15.
Management expects
growth in Eastern Europe, Middle East, India, China and California. No plans to expand in Latin America in near
term. Growth expected in contract
generation. Southern California is
supposedly the most generation-constrained region in US.
16.
Legg Mason owns over
11% of AES.
17.
Recent guidance
reaffirmed Goal of $500 – 600M debt reduction in 2005.
18.
Return on Equity is
greater than 25%. Part of the reason is
because of the leverage on the company.
What I see as potential negatives:
1. Insider selling - Not necessarily bad, and Wall Street is defending the selling. Founder of company, Roger Sant, is doing most of the selling. He founded the company in 1981. He currently owns 11,339,005 shares. He seems to be selling off small portions systematically.
2. Restatements have occurred. Makes comps more difficult. General rule of thumb is that restatements are always bad. In this case it is a bit more difficult to determine, as restatements are for discontinued operations. My gut (which certainly should not be relied upon) is that this is not a typical restatement, and hence not a negative. Nevertheless, it will be something I will be watching.
3. Slowdown in privatization of Plants.
4. Emerging Market politics and regulations.
5. Currency exposure in Central America.
6. execution of margin improvements and deregulation.
7. Rising worldwide interest rates.
8. Watch the debt levels. Some debt has been pushed out several years. Some of the debt has deferred payment obligations until 2007. This needs to be watched.
9. 22% of AES debt is at variable rates. Need to watch this if interest rates rise.
10. Legg Mason owns over 11% of AES.
11. Debt levels are high and will remain high.
Some Financial Data:
1.
Cash flow is strong. I constructed this quick table. I took
a lot of liberties and really didn’t construct guided estimates. Borrowed
estimates from several reports, etc.
Cash flow will be stronger from option exercising. Generally I don’t like this, but here cash
generation is crucial.
Projected
Cash Flow Table:
|
|
2003 |
2004e |
2005e |
2006e |
2007e |
|
Revenues |
8,415 |
8,900 |
9,600 |
10,500 |
11,000 |
Operating Cash Flow (OCF) |
1,576 |
1,450 |
1,600 |
1,700 |
1,800 |
|
Net
Income |
316 |
374 |
565 |
714 |
725 |
|
OCF/
Revenues |
18.73 |
16.29 |
16.67 |
16.19 |
16.36 |
|
Capex |
1228 |